The end of communism was supposed to put a stop to the KGB’s dirty tricks at home. After the KGB joined the abortive coup in 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev broke up the agency. The foreign-intelligence division continued to run spies, and domestic counterintelligence was renamed the Ministry of Security. The department of ideological counterintelligence was abolished. But last October, when a former security minister joined the putsch against Boris Yeltsin, and the Ministry of Security hesitated to defend the president, it became clear that the KGB was still a problematic power. Yeltsin dissolved the Ministry of Security and gave it yet another new name: the Federal Counterintelligence Service.
Nevertheless, inside the dingy Lubyanka buildings in central Moscow, the same KGB agents report to work every day. The KGB’s budget, allocated through a mysterious process that is theoretically controlled by Yeltsin, remains secret. Nikolai Golushko, the Yeltsin-appointed head of the new agency (formerly minister of security), recently admitted that most old KGB departments still exist. The Department of Eavesdropping, for example, has been renamed the Operational Technical Department.
Yeltsin hopes that by putting the KGB under his control, he can guarantee its loyalty. (Since the Ames case dates back to the mid-1980s, it’s uncertain how much Yeltsin knew about it.) In the new Constitution, he made sure that the security forces report to him rather than to the Parliament. Members of the old Parliament believe that former Parliament speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, who was released from ail last weekend thanks to an amnesty vote in the Duma, induced KGB personnel to spy on Yeltsin’s camp before the October putsch.
Though KGB officials insist that they are only watching people and organizations who could pose threats to the state, they appear to be doing more than that. They admit to watching ultranationalists. And Yeltsin’s communist opposition is convinced that it is tailed and infiltrated too. Even government ministers say their offices are bugged-though given the KGB’s powerful internal network, it is unclear whether Yeltsin is behind it. The new Constitution requires court permission for bugging-but Yeltsin recently decreed that an old law, which allows security forces in certain cases to spy for 24 hours without authorization, is still valid. Retired KGB Col. Oleg Kalugin says: “Considering the lack of discipline and authority in the country, I’m afraid can be ignored.”
For the moment, the security forces may be on Yeltsin’s side. But loyalties could waver again, as they did in the two coup attempts. Many KGB officers blame Yeltsin for the collapse of their country And even Russian democrats think the secret police are a weapon to be used in political struggle. In view of Russia’s continuing political instability, no one can predict whom the KGB will turn to the next time a political crisis appears.
title: “Back At Kgb Headquarters” ShowToc: true date: “2022-12-05” author: “Nona Chandler”
The end of communism was supposed to put a stop to the KGB’s dirty tricks at home. After the KGB joined the abortive coup in 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev broke up the agency. The foreign-intelligence division continued to run spies, and domestic counterintelligence was renamed the Ministry of Security. The department of ideological counterintelligence was abolished. But last October, when a former security minister joined the putsch against Boris Yeltsin, and the Ministry of Security hesitated to defend the president, it became clear that the KGB was still a problematic power. Yeltsin dissolved the Ministry of Security and gave it yet another new name: the Federal Counterintelligence Service.
Nevertheless, inside the dingy Lubyanka buildings in central Moscow, the same KGB agents report to work every day. The KGB’s budget, allocated through a mysterious process that is theoretically controlled by Yeltsin, remains secret. Nikolai Golushko, the Yeltsin-appointed head of the new agency (formerly minister of security), recently admitted that most old KGB departments still exist. The Department of Eavesdropping, for example, has been renamed the Operational Technical Department.
Yeltsin hopes that by putting the KGB under his control, he can guarantee its loyalty. (Since the Ames case dates back to the mid-1980s, it’s uncertain how much Yeltsin knew about it.) In the new Constitution, he made sure that the security forces report to him rather than to the Parliament. Members of the old Parliament believe that former Parliament speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, who was released from ail last weekend thanks to an amnesty vote in the Duma, induced KGB personnel to spy on Yeltsin’s camp before the October putsch.
Though KGB officials insist that they are only watching people and organizations who could pose threats to the state, they appear to be doing more than that. They admit to watching ultranationalists. And Yeltsin’s communist opposition is convinced that it is tailed and infiltrated too. Even government ministers say their offices are bugged-though given the KGB’s powerful internal network, it is unclear whether Yeltsin is behind it. The new Constitution requires court permission for bugging-but Yeltsin recently decreed that an old law, which allows security forces in certain cases to spy for 24 hours without authorization, is still valid. Retired KGB Col. Oleg Kalugin says: “Considering the lack of discipline and authority in the country, I’m afraid can be ignored.”
For the moment, the security forces may be on Yeltsin’s side. But loyalties could waver again, as they did in the two coup attempts. Many KGB officers blame Yeltsin for the collapse of their country And even Russian democrats think the secret police are a weapon to be used in political struggle. In view of Russia’s continuing political instability, no one can predict whom the KGB will turn to the next time a political crisis appears.
