The sad fact is they’re both right. So what explains the possible union of these antagonists? The answer is simple: power. Musharraf wants to retain his; Bhutto wants to get hers back. But their underlying differences remain profound, and the dangers great. While Western leaders hope a deal between them will help calm Pakistan, the truth is it probably won’t.
The Bhutto and Musharraf camps have been holding backroom talks for some time. What probably pushed the leaders to finally meet face to face was the growing threat posed by Islamic extremists. The danger became acute several weeks ago, when Musharraf ordered the Army to storm Islamabad’s Red Mosque, which had been occupied by Taliban-style militants. The operation succeeded, but it was followed by suicide bombings and the extremist takeover last week of another mosque (this time in the Mohmand tribal district).
Suddenly Musharraf was under siege both by the radical Islamists (who have tried twice to kill him) and the civilian democrats, led by Bhutto’s Pakistan’s People’s Party and the Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif, another exiled ex-prime minister. The democrats had been leading massive protests ever since Musharraf suspended Supreme Court Chief Justice Ifthikar Muhammad Chaudry, who had challenged the president’s plan to run for re-election without resigning his Army post (as the constitution requires). Following the protests, the Supreme Court reinstated Chaudry, further embarrassing the president at a time when his most powerful ally—Washington—was complaining pointedly about his failure to root out Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Pakistan’s northwest. The beleaguered general needed a lifejacket. And that’s where Bhutto came in.
A deal with her, however, will hardly cure Pakistan’s ills. While her own followers would be elated, Sharif’s Muslim League has already condemned the negotiations, as have most Islamist parties. The extremists would continue their fight. And a pact with Bhutto would require Musharraf to make several painful concessions. He would have to finesse away the corruption charges against her, which would make him look weak on the one issue where he’s seemed strong until now. Bhutto has also demanded that Musharraf agree to have the next president chosen by a newly elected parliament rather than the current one, which he dominates. A proposed constitutional amendment barring prime ministers from serving a third term would also have to be set aside (since Bhutto has already held the job twice and wants another shot at it). And even if Bhutto won the elections, her government could prove as crooked and incompetent as its predecessors. Power sharing between Bhutto as prime minister and Musharraf as president, moreover, might only increase the country’s chaos.
The West wants a stable Pakistan as a bulwark against terror—specifically, the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces that have been infiltrating Pakistan from Afghanistan. The confrontation at the Red Mosque and its violent aftermath have shown how powerful these forces have grown, shaking Musharaff to the core. However much he despises Bhutto and her ilk, they are far less dangerous to him than the jihadists. Bhutto has as much reason as Musharraf to fear further terrorism, which could tear Pakistan apart and end its economic boom. But as a relatively secular woman leader she would only be another target, not someone who could calm the radicals’ rage.
All this means that while the Musharraf-Bhutto deal could well pave the way for elections and the return of civilian rule, that would be a very limited blessing. For one thing, a free and fair vote could swing in any direction; the Islamist parties could make significant gains in the national and provincial legislatures, as they did in 2002. For another, Pakistan’s military and its intelligence services—the country’s true power brokers—would watch any change in leadership skeptically. The generals will be keen to protect their power and their economic empire, and they won’t hesitate to dislodge an elected government if either is threatened. Even if she could placate them, meanwhile, Bhutto would still have to act against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and Pakistan’s own extremists, without going too far—since many Pakistanis worry that an offensive will only bring more bloodshed and turmoil.
If this sounds grim, it is. Pakistan faces a choice, it’s true—but not one between good and bad options. It’s now a contest between bad and worse outcomes. Let’s hope the country picks carefully.
