In Iraq right now, there is a story to prove every theory. The American occupation is facing a guerrilla war; it is rebuilding Iraq with impressive speed; it is beset by logistical problems; it has unleashed a new culture of freedom; it has secured most of the country; it confronts a lawless, crime-ridden society. All true.
Yet the editors of the Post made the right decision to put the village story on the front page. The greatest challenge that the United States faces in Iraq today is not random teenage gunmen. It is not even the guerrilla insurgency, which remains sporadic and localized–though it is drawing in Islamic militants from other countries. Small bands of thugs will continue to harass American forces and even kill some, but that’s not enough to stop the activities of the occupation authority. The greatest challenge facing the United States is handling Iraqi nationalism. We need fewer villages where cooperating with Americans is seen as a capital offense.
Unfortunately, policies in Washington are making it more likely that Iraqi nationalism is becoming anti-Americanism. Last week Iraq’s Governing Council, the 25-person body of Iraqis that helps the United States run the country, chose nine members who will each serve as president of the council on a rotating basis. This committee within the committee is where real power will lie. And the group of nine is virtually identical to the Leadership Council of exiles formed last February–at the urging of the Defense Department. In other words, we have pushed our favorite Iraqis onto the center stage of Iraqi politics. All those groups and leaders who lived through Saddam Hussein’s reign cannot be pleased to see the exiles–many of whom hadn’t been in Iraq for 40 years–being foisted atop their country.
Some have wondered why a small group of people in the Pentagon–Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith–have been obsessively maintaining control of Iraq policy. They have cut out the State Department entirely. They have blocked efforts to bring in other countries or international organizations, except in a purely subsidiary role. They have constantly overruled Paul Bremer, who was wisely trying to keep the Governing Council as an advisory body. But it all makes sense if the Pentagon’s goal is to create circumstances that help the exiles gain control of Iraq. “That’s why they didn’t want extensive postwar planning, that’s why they don’t want a long transition process, that’s why they are paranoid about greater U.N. involvement. All this forces us to transfer power quickly to a reliable group of Iraqis. And right now, the exiles are the only ones around,” explains an administration official. Douglas Feith admits, “Our goal is not to turn Iraq over to any international organizations. Our goal is to turn Iraq over to the Iraqis.” Transpose two words and you have the actual policy: the goal in Iraq is to turn Iraq over to our Iraqis.
It will not work. I have nothing against Ahmad Chalabi and the rest of his band. But, with the important exception of the Kurdish leaders, none of them has any popular following yet. Today the only people in Iraq who seem to be able to bring out crowds and rally supporters are ethnic, tribal and religious leaders. In fact, the other members of the Governing Council mostly fit one of those descriptions. It only makes sense. Saddam Hussein killed or crushed all secular opposition. The only people left standing are mullahs and tribal leaders.
The key lesson of places like Bosnia is that it takes time for genuine democrats to emerge in the wake of a totalitarian dictatorship. As Paddy Ashdown, the international administrator in Bosnia, often argues, starting the political process too soon empowers those who happen to have money, megaphones or legitimacy in the early days. That is why Bremer and his team need time and resources to govern Iraq, help the Governing Council create a Constitution, build a framework of government and create the circumstances for mature politics to develop. Success on the ground will buy Bremer some time. But international support and legitimacy would help even more.
