If Georgia is a test case for Russia’s evolving policy in the “near abroad,” the rest of the former Soviet republics had better start worrying. Moscow’s professed goal of being the peacekeeper in the region, which it considers to be part of its vital interests, doesn’t necessarily alarm the West. The evidence on the ground suggests that Moscow isn’t up to the task, anyway. In Georgia, the Russians have wrenched a series of painful concessions, then failed to reward Shevardnadze with badly needed military support. The Kremlin seems unable to control its commanders–particularly after the military blasted Boris Yeltsin’s opposition out of the Russian White House. It’s not clear exactly what the commanders would do beyond Russia’s borders if they had a free hand. They aren’t likely to enforce peace in Georgia, which is torn by back-to-back civil wars, or save Shevardnadze, whose grip on power is tenuous at best.
Russia’s policy in Georgia has been inept and uncoordinated. Maverick Russian officers helped arm the successful rebels in Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia. Then, after Shevardnadze signed a treaty legalizing the presence of Russian troops in his country, Moscow offered two divisions to fight those same rebels. When the Georgians accepted, Moscow took back its offer. Without Russian support, Shevardnadze’s forces were unable to fend off the attack.
After their victory, the Abkhazians took to “ethnic cleansing,” deporting more than 200,000 Georgians from their territory. Faced with a new assault from former Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze last week literally begged the Russians for help again. Despite Georgia’s promises to cooperate with Moscow, the Russians seemed unwilling to take a decisive stand.
Many Georgians believe Moscow has a grand plan to force their country into submission. “There is nothing that suggests that kind of subtlety and efficiency of planning in Moscow,” says a Moscow-based Western diplomat. In Abkhazia, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev may have been unable to persuade the commanders to send their boys into combat. One U.S. official met with Russian military officials who said they “are not at all eager to put their troops in harm’s way.” The commanders don’t want to get sucked again into a drawn-out disaster like Afghanistan–Russia’s Vietnam. The political battle in Moscow no doubt made Yeltsin more reluctant to alienate his generals.
Perhaps the scariest factor is that the Russian military is no longer monolithic. Local commanders, suddenly without funds and purpose, are striking their own paths. “The military machine has collapsed,” says Aleksandr Konovalov, a military expert. “They have become part merchants and part mercenaries.
Following the storming of the White House, the military may clamor for a more assertive role. Says Vladimir Goncharov, 41, a lieutenant colonel from the Tula paratrooper division, which lost five men during the attack on Parliament: “Now we expect the president to understand that the army is not just people with weapons, but people who can guarantee any leader in his actions–any actions.” That’s precisely the question: what actions? Even if Yeltsin gives it a bigger share of the budget, the military has no consistent sense of direction.
The weak governments in ex-Soviet republics have no one but Moscow to turn to for help in putting down rebels. But they must have their doubts. In Azerbaijan, Russians allegedly helped oust pro-Turkish leader Abulfaz Elchibey in favor of a more proMoscow regime. They’ve done nothing to protect Azerbaijan since, letting Armenia overrun much of its territory. Incompetence and confusion seem to guide Russian policy more than imperialism. The effect .on the ground is cruel just the same.
