Why do we have different China policies? To begin with, the fact that there are lots of Chinas means that some of them are more attractive to us than others, some easier (or so we think) to understand and get along with. The situation with regard to China today is not unlike the mixed American attitudes toward the British Empire in the first half of the 20th century–mixed because there were, in reality, several British Empires. We approved of dominions like Canada and Australia because they were white and democratic and seemed like us. We disapproved of the British Raj and sympathized with the Indian independence movement. We were envious of British colonial control of Malaya (and its rubber and tin) and of the Persian Gulf (and its oil), and wanted to see it end. On the other hand, we hardly cared at all about British rule in Africa; since we denied blacks full civil rights at home, how could we?
Secondly, we have different and conflicting China policies because there are different Americas. From the viewpoint of giant American companies like Bechtel and Boeing, this is a country with which we should have the best possible relations since the market there seems so massive. Getting China into the World Trade Organization, eliminating official corruption, establishing full commercial law and staying in close touch with the authorities in Beijing during all these changes must therefore be our priorities. From the viewpoint of liberal Democrats, human-rights watchers and Christian fundamentalists, here is a regime that should be treated with suspicion until it ceases its repression in Tibet, its persecution of Roman Catholics and other acts that offend our liberal sensibilities.
From the viewpoint of the U.S. military-well, here we start getting closer to the heart of the problem. Some strategists now value China as an ally in the fight against global terrorism, as well as a counterweight to both Russia and India. Others point suspiciously to the steady evolution of Chinese missile systems, the attempts at military espionage and the long list of border disputes with its many neighbors, about which Beijing has rarely shown any sense of compromise.
In truth, because there are lots of Chinas and lots of Americas, we don’t know which kind of China we want. We do not wish the Chinese ill, as we do not wish any other people ill. But, like the proud English in the age of Queen Victoria, we do take it for granted that the closer any other people come to the American way of life, the better their lives will be. They will be freer, and richer, and we will feel pleased for them and satisfied with ourselves. What could be more delightful, and mutually advantageous?
Well, here’s the problem, and it needs to be stated in the bluntest possible terms. The plain fact is that the closer China comes to the American way of life, the more America’s share of world power will diminish. Just look at a few basic statistics. We possess less than 5 percent of the world’s population, but we create 30 percent of its total product. We account for 40 percent or more of its defense spending; we engage in 45 percent of its Internet traffic; we produce 75 percent of its Nobel laureates in science and medicine. From a purely selfish viewpoint, right now the last thing we want is for this unprecedentedly favorable position to change.
But it is changing, in large part because China is changing. Year by year the People’s Republic is becoming wealthier and, as it does, so the global power balances tilt. Here again are a few figures. The American economy, measured by GNP, is about $8 trillion or $9 trillion, while China’s is about $1.5 trillion. But China’s population is five times larger than America’s. If its GNP per capita came to equal South Korea’s–surely a strong likelihood–it would total more than $10 trillion. If it were to equal Japan’s GNP per capita, it would total some $40 trillion–way, way bigger than America’s. If Beijing then chose to spend the same amount as the United States does on defense, China’s budget would be three or four times larger.
What would the world be like a generation or two hence if, by some miraculous continuation of its rapid growth, China had the largest economy in the world–as, of course, it did for so much of history? We simply don’t know. The optimistic view would be that, if it had really become a liberal democracy, the country would be a full member of the family of nations, turn its swords into plowshares and be a partner and friend to the West. And even if it was more nationalistic and touchy, China has never shown any interest in the sort of force-projection overseas and interference in other regions that we almost take for granted as America’s current role in the world. Chinese carrier task forces off the California coast sound improbable. Moreover, from a strictly commercial viewpoint, the People’s Republic has even more interest in maintaining stable relations with us than we have with them.
So, without either joining that grim school of realists in international affairs who believe that a conflict between a rising China and a status quo America is inevitable, or sharing the idealists’ belief that we will become best buddies, we might assume that the relationship will be a “normal” one between sovereign nation-states: sometimes close, sometimes quarrelsome, but never openly hostile. China would be like, say, a larger France.
The question, though, is whether Americans could stand a France–or any other power-that was three times larger than us, rather than one quarter our size. At the end of the day this is a psychological problem, and it is not mine. Born in June 1945, exactly between the Allied victories in Europe and the defeat of Japan, and when the British Empire was at its largest extent, I grew up in England to the drumbeat of imperial retreats. The regiments came home from India and Singapore, from East Africa and the Persian Gulf. It wasn’t too bad. The nation learned to adjust, clumsily, to a diminished status. We got a National Health Service in place of a Mediterranean fleet.
This sort of epiphany is a long way off for America, which has perhaps never been more powerful than it is now. Yet the raw fact remains. The world is always in flux. The tides of change in international politics do not cease. And all the signs are that Asia, and in particular China, is on the rise.
Which China, then, should we prefer to see? A culturally arrogant question, of course, but an unavoidable one. The continuation of the Chinese one-party state is repugnant to our Western, democratic thinking. A China that disintegrates into ethnic, warring factions is a danger to all of East Asia. But a China that is superefficient and superproductive brings its own great, imponderable challenges. Are we ready for them?
